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41ST ANNUAL FOULSTON-SIEFKIN LECTURE:  






  It is an honor to deliver this year’s Foulston Siefkin Lecture, and a particular 
honor to follow in the footsteps of past lecturers like Akhil Amar, Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Rachel Moran, William Eskridge, Harold Koh, and Ruth Okediji, to 
name only a few.  My topic today is the future of Fourth Amendment law 
following the Supreme Court’s enormously important decision in Carpenter v. 
United States.1  
Carpenter extends the Fourth Amendment's protections to sensitive 
information held by third parties, a crucial step towards maintaining the Fourth 
Amendment's relevance in the digital age.  However, the Court’s opinion is 
exceedingly vague and cautious with regard to when and how the Fourth 
Amendment will protect digital information going forward.   
I will argue that the meaning of Carpenter ultimately resides in its detailed 
account of the potential harms threatened by a new form of surveillance.  The 
Court’s explanation of these harms and its concerns regarding unregulated 
government surveillance of citizens’ locations take up a large portion of its 
opinion.2  It is this discussion, more than any particular line or technical point of 
distinction from previous cases, that will shape the future of Fourth Amendment 
law.   
Moreover, the Court’s practical emphasis on the risk of privacy harm is not a 
one-off or a sharp break from previous practice.  Carpenter is consistent with a long 
 
∗ Associate Professor, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law.  What follows is an 
edited and adapted version of the 2019 Foulston Siefkin Lecture, delivered at Washburn 
University School of Law on March 28, 2019.  My thanks to the Washburn University 
School of Law for its invitation, and to the Washburn faculty members and students for 
their comments and questions.   I also wish to thank Chad Flanders and Hiroshi 
Motomura for their helpful comments and advice.  Special thanks to Christian Clark and 
Connor Plant for excellent research assistance. 
1 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
2 Id. at 2215–2220. 




line of Supreme Court decisions ignoring or reshaping previous Fourth 
Amendment doctrines when necessary to protect citizens against unchecked 
surveillance.3  It also echoes several previous cases that focus on the revealing, 
comprehensive, or intimate nature of surveillance when assessing whether a 
Fourth Amendment search has occurred.4   
Looking forward, I will discuss some of the novel surveillance technologies 
that are likely to reach the Supreme Court over the next several years or decades.  
These technologies include drones, smart homes and devices, web surfing 
surveillance, and pole cameras targeting a specific suspect’s home.   Many of these 
technologies have already been used in police investigations and evaluated by 
judges in lower court cases.  I conclude by discussing how the Supreme Court is 
likely to resolve these cases, applying the framework of Carpenter and its 
predecessors to make some tentative predictions about the future direction of 
Fourth Amendment law.      
I. THE LAW OF FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCHES  
A. The Katz Test   
The Supreme Court has generally interpreted the Fourth Amendment to 
require that the government obtain a warrant or qualify for a warrant exception 
prior to conducting a “search”.5  But what is a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment?  Most scholars consider the term to be ambiguous and capable of 
multiple meanings, and there is no direct drafting history on the subject of the 
Fourth Amendment’s scope.6   
 
3 See,e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352–59 (1967); Ferguson v. City of 
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84–85 (2001); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013). 
4 See infra notes 67−73 and accompanying text. 
5 See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914). There are several exceptions to 
the warrant requirement, including exceptions for automobiles, Carroll v. United States, 
267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925), exigent circumstances, Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 
U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967), and searches incident to arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 
763 (1969).   
6 See, e.g., Matthew Tokson, Blank Slates; Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth 
Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 70; Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the 
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 395 (1974). See generally WILLIAM JOHN CUDDIHY, 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 602-1791, 713 (2009) (“To the 




The Supreme Court initially limited the scope of the Fourth Amendment to 
“material things”7 and “constitutionally protected area[s].”8  This eventually 
changed after the development of wiretaps and “bugs” that could record people’s 
conversations—technologies that the federal government used extensively and 
abusively during the mid-twentieth century.9  The FBI, for instance, recorded 
nearly a half million conversations from the 1940s to the 1960s.10 It used these 
recordings to monitor political groups, record attorney-client conversations, 
influence judicial appointments, threaten civil rights leaders, and intimidate or 
discredit members of Congress investigating its activities.11   
As these abuses were starting to come to light, the Supreme Court expanded 
the scope of the Fourth Amendment to include intangible things.  In the 1967 case 
Katz v. United States, the Court held that government agents conducted an 
unlawful search when they recorded Katz’s telephone conversations without a 
warrant.12 The Court rejected the idea that the Fourth Amendment was limited to 
certain areas or to tangible objects.13  The majority opinion did not, however, set 
out any new test for discerning the Fourth Amendment’s scope.14  
Instead, the famous “Katz test” comes from Justice Harlan’s concurring 
opinion.  He described a two-pronged test as follows: “My understanding … is 
that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy and second, that the expectation be one that 
 
extent that the direct evidence indicates, the amendment’s ratifiers took their thoughts 
about its original meaning to the grave.”).  
7 E.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (ruling that the text of the Fourth 
Amendment expressly limits its coverage to tangible items). 
8 E.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510–11 (1961) (discussing cases holding that 
the government did not commit a Fourth Amendment “search” when it did not encroach 
on any constitutionally protected area, such as a house or office). 
9 Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 583 (2011); 
ALEXANDER CHARNS, CLOAK AND GAVEL: FBI WIRETAPS, BUGS, INFORMERS, AND THE 
SUPREME COURT 17, 24–31 (1992). 
10 Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 583 (2011); 
ALEXANDER CHARNS, CLOAK AND GAVEL: FBI WIRETAPS, BUGS, INFORMERS, AND THE 
SUPREME COURT 17, 24–31 (1992). 
11 CHARNS, supra note 10 at 77. 
12 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
13 Id. at 350–51, 353.  
14 See Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 385 
(1974). 




society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”15  In subsequent cases, this test 
was simplified, finding a search whenever the government violates a citizen’s 
“reasonable expectation of privacy.”  In recent years, the Court has held that acts 
of government trespass on constitutionally protected areas may also violate the 
Fourth Amendment.16  But the Katz test dictates the scope of Fourth Amendment 
protection in the vast majority of cases.        
B. The Third-Party Doctrine   
One of the most controversial applications of the Katz test involves what is 
called the “third-party doctrine.”  This doctrine provides that that the Fourth 
Amendment does not apply to personal information disclosed to a third party and 
obtained by the government from that party.  In Smith v. Maryland, for instance, 
the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the 
telephone numbers that a customer dialed, in part because the customer had 
voluntarily disclosed the numbers to the telephone company.17  In United States v. 
Miller, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not protect citizens’ bank 
records, which were exposed to bank employees in the ordinary course of 
business.18 
As you might imagine, the third-party doctrine is controversial.  It’s especially 
problematic in the internet era, when a huge variety of personal data is transmitted 
over the internet and processed or stored by a variety of internet service 
providers.19  The third-party doctrine threatens to erode Fourth Amendment 
protections for some or all of this data, including emails, web-surfing data, search 
terms, subscriber information, email to/from data, shared documents stored 
online, and more.20  In a recent case, however the Supreme Court limited the third 
party doctrine’s application in important ways.21  Scholars and lower court judges 
will be grappling with the ramifications of the Court’s decision for years to come. 
 
15 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).   
16 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). 
17 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
18 425 U.S. 435 (1976).  
19 Tokson, supra note 9, at 602–04.  For a more direct attack on the third-party doctrine 
and Katz’s privacy-based conception of the Fourth Amendment, see Matthew Tokson, The 
Normative Fourth Amendment, 104 Minn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019).  
20 Id. 
21 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).  




II. UNDERSTANDING CARPENTER 
Cell phones work by using radio waves to communicate with cell towers.22  
Cell phone companies typically keep records of when your cell phone signal hits 
the various antennae on their cell towers.23  With this information, they can 
determine your cell phone’s approximate location.24  Cell phone companies 
generally store this information for up to five years.25  In other words, cell phone 
location records can reveal the approximate locations and movements of a cell 
phone user over a long period of time, potentially revealing intimate and 
detailed information about their life.26   
In June of 2018, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Carpenter, a Fourth 
Amendment case involving cell phone location tracking.27  FBI agents suspected 
Timothy Carpenter of involvement in a series of robberies in the Detroit area.28  
They requested cell phone signal records from Carpenter’s wireless providers 
(MetroPCS and Sprint).29  These records allowed the FBI to determine Carpenter’s 
location 12,898 times over a total of 129 days, an average of 101 data points per 
day.30  With this information, they could place Carpenter within a sector ranging 
from one-eighth to four square miles, depending on cell tower density.31  This 
evidence placed Carpenter at the location of several of the robberies. 
Carpenter sought to have the evidence suppressed, claiming that it amounted 
to a Fourth Amendment search performed without a warrant.32  The Supreme 
Court ruled, in a 5−4 decision, that the government must typically obtain a warrant 
before accessing a user’s cell phone location information (CSLI).33   
 
22 See Mathew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy, 111 NW. U.L REV. 139, 
160 (2016).   
23 Id.  
24 Id. 
25 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218) 
26 Id. at 2217–18. 
27 Id. at 2206. 
28 Id. at 2212.  
29 Id.  
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 2218.  
32 Id. at 2212.  
33 The Court remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with 
their opinion.  Id. at 2223.  




By any standard, Carpenter is a profoundly important Fourth Amendment 
case.  But the Court’s opinion is notably “cryptic,”34 and just what it means for 
future surveillance cases is far from clear.  The Court offered no test for 
determining when the Fourth Amendment would protect information held by a 
third-party service provider.  Echoing the Katz majority opinion, the Court mostly 
just described the privacy problems associated with cell phone location tracking 
and then declared that such tracking is a Fourth Amendment search.   
Can we discern any sort of legal standard or test in the Carpenter opinion?  To 
some degree.  The key doctrinal line in the case is: “In light of the deeply revealing 
nature of CSLI, its depth, breadth, and comprehensive reach, and the inescapable 
and automatic nature of its collection, the fact that such information is gathered by 
a third party does not make it any less deserving of Fourth Amendment 
protection.”35  This nominally applies only to cell phone location data.  Moreover, 
it would be easy for future courts to limit Carpenter to its facts.  CSLI is somewhat 
unique in that it is collected automatically and is not voluntarily disclosed by the 
cell phone user.36   
Yet in practice, the Court’s approach is likely to extend Fourth Amendment 
protections to many forms of digital information.  The Carpenter opinion focuses 
on the potentially revealing and comprehensive nature of long-term location 
tracking.  It devotes only a tiny portion of its lengthy opinion to the involuntary 
nature of the data disclosure.37  The Court’s focus on the privacy harms caused by 
pervasive digital surveillance suggests that it is these harms, rather than the extent 
of consumer disclosure to third parties, that will primarily determine the scope of 
the Fourth Amendment going forward.  Moreover, Carpenter is not a one-off 
decision, nor a drastic break from the Court’s approach over the last several 
 
34 Lior Strahilevitz & Matthew Tokson, Ten Thoughts on Today’s Blockbuster Fourth 




35 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223.   
36 See Tokson, supra note 22, at 161−63 (describing how CSLI works and quoting 
decisions that mention that citizens are unaware they are disclosing their location to their 
cell service providers). 
37 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.  The court’s legal analysis on this point is limited to 
one paragraph.  See id. at 2219.  The opinion also notes that people “compulsively carry 
cell phones with them all the time,” and mentions the number of cell phones in use in the 
United States.  Id. at 2218, 2212.  The Court’s slip opinion ran to twenty-three pages. 




decades.  It is the continuation of a long trend away from doctrinal rigidity and 
towards extending Fourth Amendment protection to new surveillance contexts. 
A. Carpenter and Privacy Harm 
The Carpenter opinion is largely premised on the “seismic shifts in digital 
technology,” and the greater potential for privacy harm, that cell phones 
represent.38  Thus the Court distinguishes the third-party doctrine cases by 
emphasizing the potential harms posed by cell phone location surveillance and the 
“detailed and comprehensive record of [a] person’s movements” that it reveals.39  
It repeatedly emphasizes the changes wrought by cell phone technology in general 
and cell phone tracking in particular—technological changes that in turn require 
legal change.   Whereas extended location tracking used to be extremely difficult 
and costly, cell phones made it cheap and easy.40  The location records they 
produce are comprehensive and generally cover up to a five-year period.41  
Because these records contain so much information, they can reveal intimate 
details about the customer’s life, “revealing not only his particular movements, 
but through them his familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations.”42 
This largely normative analysis drives the opinion.  Because cell phone 
location data is so revealing and so easy to obtain in large quantities, the Fourth 
Amendment must apply to it.43  If the data were more costly to gather, or not stored 
in such massive quantities, it would be far less of a concern.44  But because the 
privacy harms of CSLI are so substantial, not even clear-cut disclosure to a third 
party is sufficient to eliminate Fourth Amendment protection.45 
Finally, the opinion suggests the Court’s increasing willingness to look 
 
38 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218, 201 L. Ed. 2d 507 (2018)  
39 Id. at 2217. 
40 Id.  
41 Id. at 2218. 
42 Id. at 2217 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing US v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 
(2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)). 
43 Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2217 (“[T]he time-stamped data provides an intimate window 
into a person’s life…[and] the Government can access each carrier’s deep repository of 
historical location information at practically no expense.”).     
44 Id.  
45 Id. at 2220. 




beyond the facts of a case to its broader implications for Fourth Amendment 
privacy.  First in Kyllo and then in Carpenter, the Court has looked beyond the 
technology at issue in the case and considered the broader surveillance context.  In 
Carpenter, the Court took account of the rapidly improving precision of CSLI 
tracking, noting that while Carpenter’s location could only be determined within 
a city-block-sized area at best, location tracking had grown more precise since 
Carpenter’s arrest and was likely to continue to advance.46      
B. The Carpenter Evolution 
Carpenter substantially limited the reach of the third-party doctrine in the 
digital era, a development with massive implications for privacy in myriad 
technological contexts.  But the decision itself is more continuous with past Fourth 
Amendment decisions than commentators have recognized.47  It is the culmination 
of a long trend towards protection against serious privacy harm, regardless of 
other doctrinal factors.   
For a start, the Carpenter opinion leans heavily on the approach endorsed by 
five Justices in 2012’s United States v. Jones.48  Across two concurrences in Jones, five 
Justices agreed that the continuous monitoring of Jones’s car violated his 
reasonable expectation of privacy, regardless of the fact that the car’s location was 
generally disclosed to the public.49  As in Carpenter, the Justices in Jones focused 
heavily on the privacy harms threatened by GPS tracking: cheap and easy 
gathering of large amounts of location data with the potential to reveal the details 
 
46 See id. at 2219. The Court also noted that the Government could infer Carpenter’s 
location more precisely by combining his cell phone location data with other information 
over time.  Id. 
47 See Kerr, [new book, or see “Implementing Carpenter on SSRN] (arguing that Carpenter 
was a sharp break from previous Katz test cases in that it was not based on property); 
Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 Harv. J.L. & Tech. (forthcoming 2019) 
(arguing that Carpenter was a radically transformational change in law), 
https://osf.io/preprints/lawarxiv/bsedj. 
48 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413−18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 
418−31 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).  The majority in Jones focused on the fact 
that the police physically trespassed on Jones’s property by touching the underside of his 
car.  Id. at 403–05.  
49 Id. at 413−18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 418−31 (Alito, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 




of a person’s life.50  Carpenter describes Jones as a key precedent51 and states that 
“[a] majority of this Court has already recognized that individuals have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements.”52  It 
describes how cell phone tracking is in some ways more invasive than the tracking 
in Jones.53  It notes that cell phone tracking is concerning because it is similar to the 
GPS technology addressed in Jones.54 It also cites Jones for the crucial proposition 
that exposure to third parties does not eliminate Fourth Amendment protection 
for pervasive location tracking.55  Carpenter enshrines the reasoning of the Jones 
concurrences in a majority opinion.  It also gains the support of Justice Roberts 
while losing that of Justice Alito.  But its general approach was largely laid out in 
the previous case. 
To be sure, Carpenter required the Court to confront the third-party doctrine 
more squarely than Jones did.  The Court’s explicit limitation of that doctrine is a 
massive victory for privacy in the digital age.  But Carpenter is not the first 
indication that the third-party doctrine may matter only in a limited set of contexts.  
Indeed, the third-party doctrine has not been applied by the Court since 1979, and 
has at times seemed to disappear whenever it would lead to an undesirable result.   
Supposedly, the third-party doctrine dictates that exposure of something to a 
third party eliminates Fourth Amendment protection in that thing.56  Yet in 
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Court held that a state hospital’s program of 
 
50 Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“GPS monitoring generates a precise, 
comprehensive record of a person's public movements that reflects a wealth of detail 
about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations … The 
Government can store such records and efficiently mine them for information years into 
the future. And because GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional 
surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary 
checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices: limited police resources and 
community hostility.”); id. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Devices like the 
one used in the present case, however, make long-term monitoring relatively easy and 
cheap…society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents and others would 
not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every 
single movement of an individual’s car for a very long period”). 
51 Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2215. 
52 Id. at 2217. 
53 Id. at 2218.  
54 Id. at 2216  (noting that both forms of tracking data “are detailed, encyclopedic, and 
effortlessly compiled”) 
55 Id. at 2220. 
56 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976). 




testing patients’ urine for cocaine violated the Fourth Amendment, despite the fact 
that patients voluntarily turned over their urine to hospital employees.57  In Stoner 
v. California, the Court held that the police must obtain a search warrant to enter a 
hotel room despite the fact that “maids, janitors, or repairmen” routinely enter and 
observe the room in the normal course of business.58  Similarly, in Jones, the routine 
exposure of one’s car to members of the public was insufficient to eliminate Fourth 
Amendment protection in the car’s location over time.59  In each case, the 
disclosure of information to third parties was overcome by other considerations, 
much as it would be in Carpenter. 
Moreover, even the Court’s famous third-party doctrine cases Miller and 
Smith did not turn entirely on third party exposure.60  Both considered at length 
“the nature of the particular documents sought” and both emphasized the 
unrevealing and non-intimate nature of the information obtained.61  Thus Smith 
noted that dialed phone numbers were not “the contents of communications,” and 
revealed “neither the purport of any communication between the caller and the 
recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether the call was even completed.”62  
Smith also held that the government could intercept phone numbers dialed for 
local calls, even though no third party recorded these numbers.63  Miller likewise 
stressed that bank deposit slips were not “private papers” and checks were “not 
confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial 
transactions.”64  Even at the apex of the third-party doctrine’s influence, the 
relatively unrevealing nature of deposit slips and dialed phone numbers may have 
 
57 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84–85 (2001).  The court granted certiorari 
only on the issue of whether the testing met the special needs exception and assumed a 
lack of patient consent, but the dissenting Justices noted that the patients’ consent was 
obvious and provided a clear basis to resolve the case.  Id. at 76; id. at 92−96 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
58 376 U.S. 483, 489–90 (1964). 
59 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 410 (2012).  
60 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018) (discussing this aspect of 
Miller and Smith).  
61  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (noting the non-intimate nature of dialed 
phone numbers); Miller, 425 U.S., at 442 (focusing on the non-sensitive “nature of the 
particular documents sought.”    
62  Smith, 442 U.S., at 741. 
63 Id. at 745 (“We are not inclined to make a crazy quilt of the Fourth Amendment, 
especially in circumstances where (as here) the pattern of protection would be dictated 
by billing practices of a private corporation.”). 
64 Miller, 425 U.S., at 442.  




played a larger role than their disclosure to bank employees or telephone 
companies.65 
Indeed, while the third-party doctrine has only mattered intermittently in 
cases involving exposure of information to third parties, judicial consideration of 
the revealing, comprehensive, or intimate nature of surveillance has been a 
through-line of the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  This is especially 
clear in recent cases like Carpenter and Jones, where the uniquely difficult questions 
posed by location surveillance have compelled the Court to examine factors 
relating to privacy harm in detail.66  But consideration of similar factors can be 
found throughout the Katz test cases.  Examples include Bond v. United States’s 
evaluation of the sensitivity of carry-on luggage,67 Florida v. Riley’s assessment of 
the “intimate details connected with the use of the home or curtilage,”68 and United 
States v. Knotts’s discussion of the possibility of “twenty-four hour surveillance of 
any citizen.”69 In United States v. Dunn, the Court concluded that police could 
visually inspect a barn because they “possessed objective data indicating that the 
barn was not being used for intimate activities of the home.”70 In Dow Chemical Co. 
v. United States, it determined that the surveillance of commercial property via 
sophisticated camera equipment was not a Fourth Amendment search because the 
“photographs here are not so revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional 
 
65 See Tokson, supra note 9, at 598−600. 
66 See Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2218 (“As with GPS information, the time-stamped data 
provides an intimate window into a person's life, revealing not only his particular 
movements, but through them his familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual 
associations … And like GPS monitoring, cell phone tracking is remarkably easy, cheap, 
and efficient compared to traditional investigative tools.  With just the click of a button, 
the Government can access each carrier's deep repository of historical location 
information at practically no expense.”); Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(“The net result is that GPS monitoring—by making available at a relatively low cost 
such a substantial quantum of intimate information about any person whom the 
Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track—may alter the relationship 
between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic society.”); Id. at 
430 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[S]ociety’s expectation has been that law 
enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—
secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual’s car for a very 
long period.”).      
67 529 U.S. 334, 337−338 (2000). 
68 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989). 
69 460 U.S. 276, 283 (1983). 
70 480 U.S. 294, 302 (1987). 




concerns.”71  In United States v. Place, it emphasized the limited amount of 
information disclosed by a drug dog sniff.72  Numerous other Katz test cases have 
relied upon similar considerations.73   
As I have argued elsewhere, the intimacy of the place or thing targeted by a 
surveillance practice, the amount of information sought, and the cost of the 
investigation are especially important factors driving the outcomes of the Court’s 
Fourth Amendment cases.74  Indeed, the Court’s rulings appear to track these 
factors in the vast majority of its “reasonable expectation of privacy” decisions to 
date.75  Ultimately, these principles are a means of assessing the extent of the 
privacy harm that a surveillance practice is likely to cause.  This assessment 
 
71 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986). 
72 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (noting that the information obtained was “limited both in the 
manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of the information 
revealed by the procedure”). 
73 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (“In the home, our cases show, all 
details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government 
eyes.”); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (“In light of our 
society's concern for the security of one’s person, it is obvious that this physical intrusion, 
penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared 
to recognize as reasonable. The ensuing chemical analysis of the sample to obtain 
physiological data is a further invasion of the tested employee’s privacy interests….“It is 
not disputed … that chemical analysis of urine, like that of blood, can reveal a host of 
private medical facts about an employee, including whether he or she is epileptic, 
pregnant, or diabetic.”); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (plurality) (“The 
undisputed evidence discloses that Dr. Ortega did not share his desk or file cabinets with 
any other employees. Dr. Ortega had occupied the office for 17 years and he kept 
materials in his office, which included personal correspondence, medical files, 
correspondence from private patients unconnected to the Hospital, personal financial 
records, teaching aids and notes, and personal gifts and mementos.”); Oliver v. United 
States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (“[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate 
activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or 
surveillance. There is no societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities, such 
as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields.”); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 
(1980) (“At the time petitioner dumped thousands of dollars worth of illegal drugs into 
Cox’s purse, he had known her for only a few days. According to Cox’s uncontested 
testimony, petitioner had never sought or received access to her purse prior to that 
sudden bailment.”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (police pat-downs are a “serious 
intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse 
strong resentment, and [are] not to be undertaken lightly”).  
74 Matthew Tokson, The Emerging Principles of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 88 Geo. Wash. L. 
Rev. (forthcoming 2020). 
75 Id. 




powerfully and consistently influences the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  
Carpenter is another in a long line of cases where the substantial privacy harms 
threatened by surveillance practices outweighed any disclosure to third parties,76 
positive law analysis,77 or empirical claim about expectations.78  Its enormous 
contributions to Fourth Amendment law do not stem from any drastic changes to 
the Court’s conceptual approach.  Rather, Carpenter makes the Court’s approach 
clearer, gives lower courts more guidance on how to address third-party doctrine 
questions, and describes how low-cost, revealing, comprehensive surveillance 
techniques threaten citizen privacy.  
III. THE NEXT GENERATION OF FOURTH AMENDMENT ISSUES 
Carpenter protects individuals from extensive location monitoring and 
expressly limits the reach of the third-party doctrine.  It does so largely on the basis 
of a practical examination of how revealing and extensive location tracking can be.  
Looking forward, it suggests that the Court will protect privacy in several other 
forms of digital information that are likewise revealing and low-cost. 
Of course, the composition of the Court will impact the outcomes of future 
cases.  As currently constituted, there appear to be at least five votes for the harm-
focused approach observed in Carpenter.  Justice Gorsuch also appears to be 
concerned about new surveillance technologies and citizen privacy, and may be 
willing to apply the Fourth Amendment to novel surveillance practices, albeit 
under a very different theory than the other Justices.  His opinions as a Tenth 
Circuit judge tend to favor privacy rights, sometimes to a remarkable degree.79  His 
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dissent in Carpenter suggested that Carpenter likely had a property right and thus 
a Fourth Amendment right in his location information.80  Indeed, Gorsuch 
“reluctantly” ruled against Carpenter largely because his counsel did not raise, 
and thus forfeited, any property-based argument.81   
It is difficult to identify any existing concept of property rights that would 
extend to business records created by one’s cell phone company.  However, if 
Gorsuch further develops the theory of property rights in data and electronic 
signals hinted at in his previous opinions,82 he may become an important 
supporter of an expansive Fourth Amendment scope.    
In the meantime, the majority of the Court is likely to continue to apply the 
Katz test and the general approach seen in Carpenter to the next wave of Fourth 
Amendment search cases.  My goal for the remainder of this lecture is to give a 
preview of some of the issues that the Court is likely to confront in its upcoming 
Fourth Amendment cases. 
A. Websurfing Data 
Records of the websites that a user visits can be collected by a variety of 
internet service providers (ISPs) or third-party entities.83  For instance, ISPs 
generally maintain logs of the IP addresses of each website a user visits along with 
the volume of data transmitted to and from the user.84 Some service providers 
monitor and retain the URL of each individual page visited by a user.85 Affiliated 
groups of websites may collect the URLs of each page a user sees within their 
group.86 Some entities place “web beacons” on affiliated websites that track in 
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granular detail the user’s activity on a particular site.87  These service providers 
and website networks can use this information to target advertisements to the 
individual user or sell the information to third-party advertisers.88    
The government has surveilled citizens’ websurfing activity and introduced 
evidence of it in several criminal cases.  For instance, in United States v. Forrester, 
government agents installed a “mirror port” on a suspect’s account with an ISP, 
enabling them to record the IP addresses of the websites that he visited and the 
total volume of information sent to or from his account.89  The Ninth Circuit held 
that this was not a Fourth Amendment search, because internet users have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in web surfing information disclosed to a third-
party ISP.90  In United States v. Ulbricht, law enforcement agents collected IP 
address data to and from a suspect’s wireless router and used the data to help link 
the suspect to an anonymous internet profile.91  The Second Circuit ruled that this 
was not a search, again because users had no privacy rights in data disclosed to a 
third party’s servers.92   
As law enforcement officials continue to track users’ internet use in criminal 
investigations, more circuit courts will rule on this issue, and the Supreme Court 
may ultimately be forced to resolve it.  How is it likely to do so?   
Ultimately, the Supreme Court is likely to protect IP addresses and other web 
surfing information against government surveillance.  Such records can be deeply 
revealing, especially in the aggregate.93  Scholars have raised concerns about the 
detailed surveillance of citizens’ reading habits, which have the potential to chill 
fundamental freedoms of thought and speech.94   
IP addresses, to be sure, typically disclose only the general websites with 
which a user communicates.95  But knowledge of which websites a user contacts, 
when and how long they do so, and how much information is sent back and forth 
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has the potential to reveal the subject matter and often the content of the user’s 
web surfing communications and activities.96  Even if government agents cannot 
know with utter certainty what an internet user is reading or seeing, compiling 
records of the IP addresses that users visit offers the government a revealing and 
invasive look into users’ personal habits, interests, and communications.97 
The disclosure of such information to third parties is unlikely to eliminate its 
Fourth Amendment protection.  Much as it did in Carpenter, the Court is likely to 
declare that the revealing and comprehensive nature of web surfing data poses 
high risks of serious privacy violations and thus requires special protection.  In 
such cases, “the fact that the information is held by a third party does not by itself 
overcome the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection.”98  Moreover, while 
users do disclose the IP addresses they visit to their ISPs, such disclosure is hardly 
avoidable in the modern world, where web surfing is as routine and as essential 
as reading paper media or visiting retail stores.99  Nor is it likely that most internet 
users have even the most basic awareness of how internet routing, IP addresses, 
or TCP/IP protocols work.100  If a voluminous record of the places where citizens 
travel in public is too private for the government to obtain without a warrant, the 
same is likely to apply to a voluminous record of everywhere they travel in 
cyberspace. 
B. Smart Homes  
Increasingly, our homes are filled with internet-connected devices, from 
“smart” speakers like Amazon’s Alexa, to Roomba vacuums, to internet connected 
refrigerators and other appliances.  These items can be useful and fun, but nearly 
all of them collect a great deal of data about their users.  This data may be 
especially sensitive, as it is gathered from inside the home and/or from items worn 
on users’ bodies.  Although courts do not yet appear to have opined on whether a 
warrant is required for police officers to gather such data from service providers 
or other intermediaries, officers have begun to collect it during criminal 
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For example, one man was indicted for murdering his houseguest after his 
smart utility meter indicated that he had used a large amount of water late at night, 
possibly to hose down the murder scene.101  Prosecutors also sought recordings 
made by the man’s Amazon Echo.102  Another man was charged with murdering 
his wife after her Fitbit data showed her moving around after she had supposedly 
been killed by an intruder, and his key fob showed that he was home after he 
claimed to have left for work.103  And a suspect charged with aggravated arson 
and insurance fraud ran into trouble when data obtained from his pacemaker 
contradicted his story of smashing his bedroom window and fleeing after being 
awoken by a fire.104    
The potential for government officials to obtain data about the inside of 
citizens’ homes has raised serious concerns among scholars and commentators.105  
Carpenter itself does not address smart home devices, and future courts could 
easily distinguish them from cell phone tracking.  Cell phones are ubiquitous in 
modern life, and the disclosure of cell phone users’ locations happens 
automatically and likely without cell phone users’ knowledge.106  Most smart 
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home devices remain very much optional, and even popular devices such as smart 
speakers (like Alexa) are found in fewer than a quarter of US households.107  
Moreover, when users engage with smart speakers, it is relatively clear that they 
are disclosing information directly to an internet-connected device.108  Because the 
disclosure of information to third parties is more volitional and less automatic in 
the smart home context than with cell phones, it is certainly possible that a future 
court would hold that the third-party doctrine eliminates Fourth Amendment 
rights in information disclosed to smart home devices.   
This is, however, an unlikely outcome.  First, the Supreme Court has protected 
the privacy of the home in a wide variety of cases, even against relatively minimal 
privacy intrusions109 and even when precedent or logic appeared to dictate a 
different result.110  Second, Carpenter’s discussion of voluntary disclosure takes up 
only a tiny portion of the majority opinion, and the issue does not appear to greatly 
concern the Justices.111  And finally, the enormous privacy harms that would result 
from warrantless government surveillance of recordings and other sensitive 
information from the inside of people’s homes are likely to motivate the Court to 
distinguish or disavow any prior doctrines that would counsel against declaring 
such surveillance a Fourth Amendment search.  Even more so than the 
surveillance in Carpenter, obtaining recordings of people’s homes could be 
extremely revealing and could paint a comprehensive picture of their private 
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lives.112  The Court is again likely to address these concerns, regardless of what a 
strict application of the third-party doctrine might dictate. 
C. Pole Cameras 
Pole cameras refer to cameras placed on utility poles or street lights for the 
purpose of observing persons or property.  Such cameras are widely used in cities 
throughout the country, and have been employed by federal agencies as well as 
local police departments.113  Perhaps the most interesting legal question arising 
from the use of pole cameras involves cameras that constantly record video of the 
exterior of a residence and its curtilage.  Although most courts have held that long-
term video surveillance of the exterior of a home is not a search, other courts 
disagree.114  Moreover, lower courts may be less reluctant to find that pole cameras 
are a search in the post-Carpenter era.  In any event, it is somewhat likely that the 
issue of pole camera surveillance of residential property will eventually reach the 
Supreme Court.   
The facts of pole camera cases may vary, as the cameras may be covert or 
obvious, may observe the entirety of a suspect’s yard or just a portion, and may 
capture video for a few weeks or several months.115  Typically, the cases involve 
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monitoring a front yard for several weeks or more, from a vantage point not 
meaningfully different from that of a passerby on a public street.   
In general, cases holding that video surveillance of the exterior of a home is 
not a search conclude that defendants have no reasonable expectation of privacy 
because the exterior of their home is exposed to the public.116  Yet Carpenter rejected 
similar reasoning about the exposure of information.  The Court emphasized that 
mere exposure of something to third parties will not necessarily render it 
unprotected by the Fourth Amendment.  When a surveillance practice is especially 
invasive, comprehensive, and/or inescapable, it may be prohibited by the Fourth 
Amendment regardless of whether the information it captures might in theory be 
observed by others.117      
  Courts finding the use of pole cameras to be a search generally focus on the 
continuous, long-term nature of the surveillance at issue.  Pole cameras capture 
“activities outside [the] home twenty-four hours a day.”118  Such surveillance is 
“electronic,” “continuous,” “intrusive[],” far lower in cost, and easier to hide than 
traditional, in-person surveillance.119  Further, as one court noted, 
[T[his type of surveillance does not grow weary, or blink, or have 
family, friends, or other duties to draw its attention. Much like the 
tracking of public movements through GPS monitoring, long-term 
video surveillance of the home will generate “a wealth of detail about 
[the home occupant’s] familial, political, professional, religious, and 
sexual associations.”120  
These observations echo those later made by the Supreme Court in Carpenter.  
Justice Roberts’s opinion for the Court expressed concern about the continuous 
and voluminous nature of cell phone tracking, which “provides an all-
encompassing record of the [user’s] whereabouts” and does so “at practically no 
expense.”121  Cell phone tracking, like continuous video monitoring, is “not about 
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… a person’s movement at a particular time.”122  Rather, it creates “a detailed 
chronicle of a person’s physical presence compiled every day, every moment, over 
several years,” and is accordingly a Fourth Amendment search, even if momentary 
or in-person tracking of a suspect would not be.123  
The resonances between Carpenter and the cases holding long-term pole camera 
surveillance unconstitutional suggest the Court is likely to rule that such 
surveillance violates the Fourth Amendment.  Although one’s movements in 
public are in theory observable by others, the constant tracking of a person’s 
movements for long periods of time by technological means violates their 
reasonable expectations of privacy.124  Similarly, although a house and its curtilage 
are in theory exposed to public view, people reasonably expect that their houses 
will not be constantly surveilled for weeks or months by a hidden camera.  While 
the outcome of the pole camera issue remains uncertain, especially given the many 
lower court precedents upholding their warrantless use, it is ultimately probable 
that the Supreme Court will find long-term pole camera surveillance of a residence 
to be a Fourth Amendment search.    
D. Drones 
A drone is an unmanned aircraft guided by remote control or an onboard 
computer.  Law enforcement and other public safety agencies in 49 states have 
acquired drones for various uses.125  The most widely owned model used by such 
agencies has a 20-megapixel camera capable of shooting high resolution video or 
still photos.126  It can be controlled at a distance of 4.3 miles and has a top speed of 
45 miles per hour.127 Like most drones operated by public agencies, its surveillance 
capabilities are somewhat limited by its maximum flight time of thirty minutes.128  
Still, drone capabilities are improving, and many military-grade drones can 
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remain airborne for several days.129  Some commercially available drones offer 
autopilot modes, including modes that allow for constant camera surveillance of 
a specific building, object, or location.130   
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court heard cases involving airplane and helicopter 
surveillance, and these rulings are relevant to the Fourth Amendment status of 
drones.  In California v. Ciraolo, police officers chartered an airplane that flew 1,000 
feet over Ciraolo’s property, and the officers visually observed marijuana plants 
in Ciraolo’s back yard.131  The Court held that visual observation of the curtilage 
of a home from an airplane operating in publicly navigable airspace was not a 
Fourth Amendment search because it did not violate Ciraolo’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy.132  The Court reached a similar holding in Florida v. Riley, 
concluding that visual observation from a lawfully operated helicopter was not a 
Fourth Amendment search.133  In both cases, the Court emphasized that the aircraft 
were operated in compliance with applicable regulations, and suggested that only 
unlawful flights would violate people’s reasonable expectations of privacy.134    
The likely outcome of a future drone surveillance case will depend on the 
particular facts.  If police officers were to lawfully operate a drone in order to 
surveil a suspect’s yard for half an hour, it is likely that the Court would find such 
surveillance constitutional under Ciraolo and Riley.  Although such surveillance 
would be cheaper than helicopter or airplane surveillance, it would still be 
analogous to observation by a manned aircraft.  It is unlikely that any differences 
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between piloted aircraft and manually flown drones would be important enough 
to distinguish the Court’s prior cases.  It would also be relatively easy for the 
officers to comply with federal drone regulations, which set no minimum height 
for drone flight.135  The regulations do prohibit drone flights during night hours, 
but drone operators can apply for a waiver so long as they demonstrate that the 
operation can be conducted safely.136  Some state laws prohibit drone surveillance 
without a warrant, but most do not.137  
Continuous, auto-piloted drone surveillance for an extended period of time 
would likely yield a different result.  Prolonged visual surveillance of a person’s 
curtilage would begin to resemble the comprehensive, invasive surveillance that 
the Court identified in Carpenter and the Jones concurrences.138  The government 
could obtain a detailed record of the homeowner’s comings and goings, who 
visited their home and when, and any actions they or their family members take 
in their front or back yard.  As with extended location monitoring in public, 
observers could build up a revealing dossier of information about an individual’s 
associations and activities around and (via inference) inside of their home.139  It is 
unlikely that the Court would allow such harmful government surveillance to go 
unregulated, even if the drone flight complied with all applicable laws and 
regulations.  Just as the third-party doctrine did not eliminate citizens’ privacy 
interests against cell phone location tracking, mere compliance with drone 
regulations is unlikely to eliminate homeowners’ privacy interests against 
extended video surveillance of their curtilage.  In other words, the Court would 
likely require the police to obtain a warrant before engaging in extended drone 
surveillance of a suspect’s yard. 
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Predicting the future of Fourth Amendment law is necessarily an uncertain 
and imprecise endeavor.  The composition of the Court could change, the Justices 
could change their minds, or the law itself could be transformed by subsequent 
cases.  There is likewise no guarantee that the surveillance technologies described 
above will reach the Court, or that other, as yet unknown techniques will not 
supersede the ones described here.    
Looking toward the future is nonetheless important, especially in the 
surveillance context.  In doing so, “[t]he best way to suppose what may come, is 
to remember what is past.”140  The next wave of Fourth Amendment challenges is 
likely to come from technologies that are increasingly ubiquitous, like drones and 
smart devices, and those on which lower courts have already ruled, like web 
surfing and pole cameras.  And the Court’s approach in future cases is likely to be 
an extension of its approach in previous cases that dealt with then-novel 
surveillance technologies.   
When law enforcement practices capture information that is particularly 
revealing or comprehensive, and thereby threaten too much harm to citizens’ 
privacy, the Court is likely to require a warrant under the Fourth Amendment.  
This is true regardless of doctrines or precedents that seem to point in the other 
direction—though such doctrines may still play a role in borderline cases.  
Carpenter is hardly the first case to exemplify the Court’s concern with the nature 
and extent of the harms caused by modern surveillance.  It is nonetheless a major 
step forward for privacy, and the clearest indication yet that the Fourth 
Amendment will maintain its relevance in the digital age. 
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